Post by account_disabled on Jan 10, 2024 5:50:49 GMT -5
and sufficient to authorize the suspension of the enforceability of the credit created, in relation to the value that exceeds the percentage of 10% (ten percent), on the value of the import operation" [8] . This is a correct interpretation. Firstly, because the ostensible importer — by serving as a "frontman" — is a co-author of the same infraction committed by the hidden importer. The transfer of a name is not an autonomous action, but an integral and inseparable part of the conduct prohibited and sanctioned by the legal system. Therefore, there is no need to consider a formal competition. What we have is a unity of fact and a plurality of competing infraction types of apparent applicability: § 3 of article 23, V, of Decree-Law nº .
1,455/1976 and article 33 of Law nº 11,488/2007. The apparent competition is ruled out through the logical criterion of the specialty. This, as we know, establishes that — if there is more than one type of infraction with elements in common — the one with the greatest number of specializing attributes applies. Article 33 eliminates the impact of § 3 of article 23, Phone Number List V, because it specifically describes the conduct of the ostensible importer who gives up his name to cover up the foreign trade operation carried out by third parties. Law No. 11,488/2007 — due to the reduced size of the benefit received by the ostensible importer and the .
economic hyposufficiency of those who play the role of figurehead — established a specific sanction, proportional to the seriousness of their actions, valued objectively by 10% [9] . Furthermore, the forfeiture penalty — transformed into a substitute fine — cannot result in a more serious legal consequence for the taxpayer. Responsibility for loss lies with the hidden importer. The latter, as the owner of the goods, is the legal recipient of the sanction, that is, the person who must suffer the negative patrimonial effects provided for by the legal order. Conversion — which is nothing more than a hypothesis of inapplicability due to loss of the object of the forfeiture penalty — cannot change this normative reality, making the ostensible importer liable for both sanctions cumulatively. This – before and after conversion – is subject to only the .
1,455/1976 and article 33 of Law nº 11,488/2007. The apparent competition is ruled out through the logical criterion of the specialty. This, as we know, establishes that — if there is more than one type of infraction with elements in common — the one with the greatest number of specializing attributes applies. Article 33 eliminates the impact of § 3 of article 23, Phone Number List V, because it specifically describes the conduct of the ostensible importer who gives up his name to cover up the foreign trade operation carried out by third parties. Law No. 11,488/2007 — due to the reduced size of the benefit received by the ostensible importer and the .
economic hyposufficiency of those who play the role of figurehead — established a specific sanction, proportional to the seriousness of their actions, valued objectively by 10% [9] . Furthermore, the forfeiture penalty — transformed into a substitute fine — cannot result in a more serious legal consequence for the taxpayer. Responsibility for loss lies with the hidden importer. The latter, as the owner of the goods, is the legal recipient of the sanction, that is, the person who must suffer the negative patrimonial effects provided for by the legal order. Conversion — which is nothing more than a hypothesis of inapplicability due to loss of the object of the forfeiture penalty — cannot change this normative reality, making the ostensible importer liable for both sanctions cumulatively. This – before and after conversion – is subject to only the .